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Abstract
Safe areas established by powerful states can improve short-term civilian protection 
during ethnic civil wars. Paradoxically, however, they may worsen the plight of vulner-
able civilians over the medium term. This can occur in three ways. First, when safe 
areas encompass sizeable territories within a broader conflict zone, they may reduce 
incentives for protected groups to compromise during peace negotiations, thus pro-
longing hostilities. Second, there is a nontrivial possibility that protected groups will 
use the safe areas as a base for launching high-risk offensives, deliberately putting ci-
vilians at risk in the hope of drawing the protection forces more deeply into the war. 
Third, safe areas may embolden protected groups to seek unilateral secession, further 
increasing the risk of conflict escalation. By elucidating the causal mechanisms in-
volved, this  article helps us assess the probability of these outcomes occurring. States 
that consider intervening militarily to establish safe areas in ethnic civil wars need to 
weigh the short-term benefits against these possible longer-term downsides.
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Safe areas are central to current debates about civilian protection in civil war 
situations. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, there have been persistent 
calls for powerful states to establish safe areas in Middle Eastern countries 
torn apart by ethno-sectarian violence—notably, Syria, Libya and Iraq. With 
respect to Syria, editorials and opinion pieces in Western newspapers have 
called on the United States and nato to ‘lead international forces protecting 
mainly Sunni and Kurdish areas’ until a political settlement can be reached.1 
Concerning Libya, already in 2011, the Arab League called on powerful states 
acting through the United Nations Security Council (unsc) to ‘establish safe 
areas in places exposed to shelling’.2 Regarding Iraq, pundits and human rights 
activists have urged the United States and its allies to establish safe areas for 
Christian and Turkmen minorities.3 There have also recently been calls to set 
up safe areas in other conflict zones, such as in Rakhine State in Myanmar to 
protect vulnerable Rohingya civilians.4
Internationally proclaimed safe areas where vulnerable populations can 
find shelter from violent conflict without having to leave their own state seem-
ingly offer an appealing, relatively low-cost means of civilian protection during 
civil wars. More coercive types of humanitarian intervention aimed at forcing 
local parties to accept a political solution have been criticised on grounds that 
they violate state sovereignty, are likely to result in protracted international 
occupations, and temporarily upset the local balance of power in ways that 
make genuinely self-sustaining peace settlements more difficult.5 By contrast, 
1 ‘Syria: What Next?’, The Economist, 15 April 2017. See also Thomas L. Friedman, ‘President 
Trump’s Real-World Syria Lesson’, New York Times, 5 April 2017; Nicholas Burns and James 
Caffrey, ‘The Diplomatic Case for America to Create a Safe Zone in Syria’, Washington Post, 
4 February 2016; and Kori Schake, ‘Safe Zones Proved Their Value after the Gulf War’, New York 
Times, 19 July 2016.
2 ‘Outcome of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Arab League on the Implications of Cur-
rent Events in Libya’, 12 March 2011, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document 
-archive/government, accessed 12 January 2018. Subsequently, in 2015, European and North 
African countries reportedly held serious discussions about setting up ‘a safe zone in eastern 
Libya that would extend from the Mediterranean coast … to the border with Niger’. See bbc 
Monitoring Middle East, ‘Algeria, Tunisia “Rejected Western proposal for safe zone” in Libya 
in 2015’, 11 June 2016.
3 See, for instance, Dominique Soguel, ‘A Sanctuary for Iraqi Yazidis’, Christian Science Monitor, 
12 August 2014; and Andrew Doran, Robert Nicholson, Stephen Hollingshead, and Robert 
Destro, ‘Safe Zone: Security in the Aftermath of isis’, The American Interest, 2 March 2017.
4 Serajul Quadir, Ruma Paul, and Krishna N. Das, ‘Bangladesh Wants “Safe Zones” to Ease 
 Rohingya Crisis’, Reuters, 8 September 2017.
5 Some of the most influential writings in this vein are Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian 
 Intervention and State Sovereignty’, International Journal of Human Rights, 6/1: 81–102 (2002); 
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the argument goes, when powerful states intervene with the narrower goal of 
establishing safe areas, they can discharge their responsibility to protect vul-
nerable civilians by relying primarily on deterrence and defence rather than 
coercion. Because safe areas involve only limited interference in domestic poli-
tics, local parties are left to resolve their differences largely on their own, which 
increases the prospects that any peace settlement that is achieved will hold. 
Finally, safe areas set up in war-torn countries can help reduce international 
refugee flows, thereby offering further pragmatic appeal to rich-world politi-
cians faced with domestic political backlash against incoming refugees.6
Safe areas established by powerful states with robust military capabilities 
can undoubtedly improve civilian protection in civil war situations, at least in 
the short term. However, internationally proclaimed safe areas, set up with-
out the consent of one or several local parties to the conflict (that is, ‘non- 
consensually’), are in fact fairly intrusive. Establishing such areas may  require 
that intervening powers initially adopt a strategy of military coercion, or ‘com-
pellence’, until the immediate threat to the population is withdrawn. Only once 
this is achieved can the interveners shift to a deterrence strategy (involving the 
threat of punishing military action in response to violations of the area), to be 
complemented by defensive operations as necessary (aimed at repelling hos-
tile incursions should they occur).7 
Either way, the deployment of robust international military forces to estab-
lish and enforce safe areas in civil wars, like other forms of military interven-
tion, can be expected to shift the balance of power on the ground and with it 
the incentives facing local political actors—especially when safe areas encom-
pass sizeable territories within a broader conflict zone. After such safe areas 
have been established, the leaders of protected groups are likely to become 
Alan J. Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Bal-
kans’, International Studies Quarterly, 52/1: 49–80 (2008); Richard K. Betts, ‘The Delusion of 
Impartial Intervention’, Foreign Affairs, 73/6: 20–33 (1994); and Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation 
Dilemma (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2011).
6 See, for example, Burns and Caffrey, ‘The Diplomatic Case for a Safe Zone in Syria’; Doran 
et al., ‘Safe Zone: Security in the Aftermath of isis’; and Lokman Çetinkaya, Safe Zone: 
A Response to Large-Scale Refugee Outflows and Human Suffering (New York: Springer, 2017).
7 For helpful discussions of safe areas from a military operations perspective, see Barry Posen, 
‘Military Responses to Refugee Disasters’, International Security, 21/1: 93–105 (1996); Taylor 
Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 187–90; and Sarah Sewall, ‘Military Options for Pre-
venting Atrocity Crimes’ in Serena Sharma and Jennifer Welsh (eds.), The Responsibility to 
Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016), pp. 168–77.
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more risk acceptant. This, I argue, may paradoxically undermine civilian pro-
tection over the medium term.
Non-consensual, sizeable safe areas established by powerful states in situa-
tions of ethnic civil war can produce adverse outcomes in three ways. First, they 
may reduce incentives for the leaders of protected groups to compromise dur-
ing negotiations, thereby making consensual peace agreements more difficult 
and potentially prolonging hostilities. Second, there is a nontrivial possibility 
that protected groups will use the safe areas as a base for launching high-risk 
offensives, deliberately putting civilian lives at risk in the hope of drawing the 
protection forces more deeply into the war. Third, protected groups may be 
emboldened to seek unilateral secession, increasing the risk of conflict es-
calation and thus further jeopardising civilian security. These dynamics can 
interact in complex ways; nevertheless, I discuss them separately, simplifying 
somewhat in order to illustrate and analyse underlying mechanisms.
This article focuses on safe areas that: (a) are established in situations 
of ethnic civil war, where opposing groups tend to be fairly cohesive and 
 deeply  mutually hostile; (b) are proclaimed against the will of one or several 
local  parties to the conflict; (c) are set up and policed by powerful external 
 actors, such as the United States and its most militarily capable allies; and 
(d)  encompass sizeable territories, such as major cities, districts, and entire 
regions. For the purpose of the article, I define ‘safe areas’ as designated por-
tions of a state’s territory, involving the deployment of external military forces, 
with the primary purpose of offering protection to threatened civilian popula-
tions in situations of violent conflict.8 I use the terms ‘safe area’, ‘safe zone’, and 
‘safe  haven’ interchangeably. When discussing ethnic civil wars, I use the term 
‘ ethnic’ as shorthand for ethno-linguistic, tribal, and religious.9
There have been only four instances of large safe areas established by 
powerful states in situations of ethnic civil war, all of them over the last quar-
ter century: the Kurdish safe enclave set up by the United States and its allies in 
northern Iraq in 1991; the Bosnian safe areas that were formally proclaimed by 
the unsc in 1993 and had nato theoretically committed to their protection; 
the zone humanitaire sûre established by France in Rwanda in 1994 towards the 
end of the civil war there; and finally, the de facto safe zone encompassing all 
of Kosovo that was established by nato after the 1999 air campaign against 
8 Similar definitions can be found in Phil Orchard, ‘Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas for 
Civilian Protection’, Global Governance, 20/1: 55–75 (2014), p. 55; and Çetinkaya, Safe Zone, p. 1.
9 For a justification of this approach, see Kanchan Chandra, ‘Ethnic Parties and Democratic 
Stability’, Perspectives on Politics, 3/2: 235–52 (2005).
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Serbia.10 The Rwandan safe zone was set up very late during the civil war, when 
the capital, Kigali, was about to fall and the underlying power struggle was 
thus all but resolved; it had only a modest impact in terms of civilian protec-
tion, and it was terminated after less than two months. Therefore, it is of only 
limited interest for the purpose of this article, and I will not discuss it further.11 
By contrast, the safe areas established in northern Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo all 
aimed to offer longer-term protection through a combination of ground troops 
and air power, while the broader political dispute remained unresolved. These 
safe areas all made important contributions to civilian protection in the short 
term; yet at the same time, to varying degrees, they had problematic implica-
tions over the medium term.
This article is not a call for general pessimism about safe areas. Instead, by 
elucidating the mechanisms through which safe areas established by powerful 
states can produce adverse outcomes in terms of civilian protection over the 
medium term, the article helps us assess the probability of these outcomes oc-
curring. It thereby facilitates consequentialist moral reasoning, which rests on 
evaluating the likely consequences of various courses of action, and it may con-
tribute to more informed policymaking. Ultimately, national decision- makers 
in the United States and elsewhere who consider deploying their country’s 
military assets to establish safe areas during ethnic civil wars need to carefully 
weigh the short-term benefits against possible longer-term downsides. As long 
as the benefits are expected to be substantial, safe areas can be a worthwhile 
policy option. Nevertheless, we need to be aware of the risks.
Sometimes, I will conclude, especially when powerful states are unwilling 
to shoulder potentially long-term commitments and a fortiori when the lo-
cal parties clamouring for protection have previously manifested secessionist 
tendencies, military intervention to establish and enforce extensive safe areas 
may be unwise. Alternative policy options should then be explored. Power-
ful states could offer logistical and financial support to un peacekeepers who 
are already deployed in civilian protection missions to establish smaller safe 
areas that are unlikely to affect local conflict dynamics (for example, around 
10 On Kosovo as a de facto safe area, see Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 
pp. 215–18.
11 For useful discussions of the Rwandan safe zone, see Gérard Prunier, ‘Operation Tur-
quoise: A Humanitarian Escape’ in Howard Adelman (ed.), The Path of a Genocide: The 
Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, nj: Transaction Publishers, 2000); 
Carol McQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 123–48; and Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strang-
ers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 231–37.
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displaced person camps). Another option would be for powerful states to use 
their good offices in an effort to persuade the local parties themselves to set up 
consensual safe areas, or ‘neutral zones’ (perhaps on the basis of reciprocity, 
when each side has vulnerable populations), and subsequently to help deploy 
un peacekeepers to monitor compliance.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: The next section briefly in-
troduces the notion of rights-based consequentialism, which constitutes the 
moral foundation for my analysis. Thereafter, I briefly trace the historical evo-
lution of safe areas: I discuss in particular the experiences in Bosnia and north-
ern Iraq during the 1990s, given how central these cases are to current debates. 
Following on from that, I examine the potential problematic consequences of 
safe areas in greater detail and identify related causal mechanisms. I develop 
my argument through a combination of deductive reasoning, historical pro-
cess tracing, and counterfactual analysis. The conclusion calls for a morally 
informed cost-benefit assessment.
 Safe Areas and Rights-Based Consequentialism
Consequentialism, as the term suggests, is an ethical theory which holds that 
our moral assessment of an activity should be based primarily on whether it 
produces good consequences, or outcomes. The best-known form of conse-
quentialism is utilitarianism, which identifies the ‘good’ as utility (defined as 
aggregate welfare or happiness). Utilitarianism is usually viewed as incompati-
ble with individual rights-based moral arguments. But there are non-utilitarian 
forms of consequentialism that allow us to posit other values, such as human 
rights, as the intrinsically good state of affairs. As Amartya Sen notes, ‘although 
a rights-based moral theory cannot coexist with “welfarism” [that is, traditional 
utilitarianism], it can very well do so with [other forms of] consequentialism’.12 
Rights-based consequentialism, which Sen pioneered, holds that in our moral 
evaluation of a particular activity, we should proceed by ‘incorporating the 
value of right fulfilment and the disvalue of right violation in the assessment 
of resulting states of affairs’.13
This article focuses on the consequences of safe areas established by 
powerful states in terms of physical integrity rights. The purpose of safe ar-
eas is to protect civilians from bodily harm; therefore, it seems appropriate 
12 Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (New York: Blackwell, 1987), p. 75.
13 Ibid., p. 73. For a useful discussion see also William J. Talbott, ‘Consequentialism and 
 Human Rights’, Philosophy Compass, 8/11: 1030–40 (2013).
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to  evaluate them first and foremost against their ability to actually improve 
people’s enjoyment of these most basic human rights, not only in terms of 
stopping  immediate rights violations but also in terms of lowering (or at least 
not  increasing) the chances of large-scale rights violations in the future. I thus 
agree with James Pattison that we should judge humanitarian interventions, 
including those aimed at establishing and enforcing safe areas, by whether 
they effectively ‘increase enjoyment of human rights in the long term, com-
pared to other potential courses of action—the counterfactual’.14
The relevant baseline for comparison is a hypothetical alternative world in 
which outside powers stopped short of proclaiming and enforcing large safe 
areas and instead sought, for instance, to facilitate pragmatic agreements 
among the warring parties by applying diplomatic pressure and offering vari-
ous inducements. Although such counterfactual reasoning is inherently diffi-
cult, scholars increasingly recognise that carefully constructed counterfactuals 
can help us to ‘probe the causes and contingency of the world we know’ and 
‘are an indispensable means of evaluating it, empirically and normatively’.15
 Effective Protection through Muscular Deterrence?
The current understanding of safe areas as requiring robust enforcement by 
outside actors is relatively new, emerging only during the 1990s. Before that, 
safe areas used to be more modest undertakings: they were typically estab-
lished through negotiations among the conflicting parties, were limited to spe-
cific buildings and their immediate surroundings (for instance, hospital zones 
or religious complexes), were more or less fully demilitarised, and relied on the 
parties’ voluntary compliance. During the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, such limited safe areas were set up on a few occasions pursuant to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians in war, such as dur-
ing the 1971 Bangladesh War and the later phases of the Vietnam War. These 
safe areas were usually monitored by neutral observers from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, without any international military deployment. 
These early safe areas were also entirely apolitical, reflecting the traditional 
14 James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 74, 81. See also Seybolt, Humanitarian Military 
 Intervention, Ch. 2.
15 Richard Ned Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princ-
eton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 6, 17. See also Philip Tetlock and Aaron Bel-
kin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, nj: Princeton 
University Press, 1996).
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understanding of humanitarianism as a neutral and impartial approach to re-
lieving human suffering.16
Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, the international com-
munity’s attention was drawn to a seemingly new type of ethno-sectarian 
conflict: in regions as disparate as the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the African 
Great Lakes region, civilians were no longer mere bystanders to the violence 
but were instead increasingly targeted because of their membership in partic-
ular groups. In light of these perceived changes in the character of war, many 
in the humanitarian community concluded that traditional safe areas based 
on consent and voluntary compliance by the conflicting parties were no longer 
adequate. Nevertheless, the awareness that robust enforcement by powerful 
outside actors might be desirable emerged only slowly—in large part as a re-
sult of the experience in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia.
 Bosnia
The Bosnian War was a three-way ethnic conflict between Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs. In the late spring of 1993, roughly one year into the war, 
the unsc designated six Bosnian towns with majority Muslim populations— 
Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac, as well as the capital, Sarajevo—
as ‘safe areas’. The goal was to prevent the militarily stronger Bosnian Serb fac-
tion from taking control of these besieged Muslim enclaves.
Srebrenica was initially declared a demilitarised zone in March 1993, loosely 
following the Geneva Conventions, on the basis of a un-mediated agreement 
among the local parties.17 As a un document from this period pointed out, 
‘the demilitarisation of Srebrenica was a step agreed by the parties … [Conse-
quently,] the onus remains on the parties to treat Srebrenica as a “safe area”’.18 
Over the next several weeks, however, the United States and its European al-
lies moved away from this consent-based model, and the remaining safe areas 
were proclaimed over Serb objections. (UNSC Resolution 824, adopted in May 
1993, simply demanded that all the aforementioned towns be treated as safe 
16 See Karin Landgren, ‘Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area’, 
 International Journal of Refugee Law, 7/3: 438–40 (1995); and McQueen, Humanitarian 
 Intervention and Safety Zones, pp. 3–6.
17 The Serbs seemingly consented to this primarily to prevent un peacekeepers, who had 
entered Srebrenica while escorting humanitarian convoys but then considered the pos-
sibility of staying put to protect the town’s population, from establishing a protected safe 
area de facto. See McQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones, pp. 58–64.
18 Kofi Annan, ‘Srebrenica’, diplomatic cable, un Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
to unprofor Zagreb (Doc. No. msc 676), 23 April 1993.
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areas). This in spite of the fact that the Western powers had no clear position 
on how, or indeed whether, to defend the areas in case of attack.
Security Council Resolution 836, adopted in June, mandated un peacekeep-
ers ‘to deter attacks against the safe areas’ and authorised ‘member states, 
acting nationally or through regional organisations … to take all necessary 
measures, through the use of air power … in reply to bombardments against 
the safe areas’. Yet us President Bill Clinton, under pressure from a risk-averse 
Pentagon, declined to deploy  American ground troops to actually defend 
the safe areas. Instead, the Americans insisted on aerial deterrence through 
nato.19 The western Europeans, for their part—primarily Britain, France, and 
the Netherlands—contributed additional troops to the un protection force in 
Bosnia (unprofor); but these troops were constrained by highly restrictive 
rules of engagement and thus offered little more than a symbolic deterrent. 
The Europeans remained hesitant to countenance nato air strikes, fearing 
an escalation, even after the safe areas came under attack from Serb forces.20 
Consequently, nato did not launch its first limited air strikes until the spring 
of 1994, and for a full year thereafter, the alliance’s military action amounted to 
‘really just the odd bomb here and there’, as Robert Hunter, the us ambassador 
to nato at the time, recalls.21
The expectation, or hope, was that the mere presence of un troops and the 
threat of air strikes would deter attacks against the safe areas. But by the end of 
1994, the Bosnian Serbs had exposed the West’s deterrent threat as a bluff, and 
un forces were essentially impotent in the face of intensifying Serb  shelling of 
the Bihac safe area. Although nato at first launched limited air strikes against 
Serb positions in early November, it swiftly suspended these  after the Serbs 
took about 250 un peacekeepers hostage and European  governments insisted 
that nato should desist from further action. Policymakers in  Washington, 
still determined to limit us liability, privately concluded in late Novem-
ber 1994 that, for the time being, ‘the “stick” of military pressure seems no 
 longer viable’.22  After this, there were no further nato air strikes for several 
19 For a discussion of how us policy on Bosnia was influenced by civil-military relations, see 
Stefano Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: us Civil-Military Relations and Multi-
lateral Intervention (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2015), Ch. 4.
20 See Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and Inter-
national Intervention (Armonk, ny: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 264–68.
21 Author interview with Robert Hunter, us Permanent Representative to nato, 1993–97 
(Arlington, va, 11 March 2010). For details of the air strikes, see United Nations General 
Assembly (unga), ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the fall of Srebrenica’, a/54/549, 15 
November 1999, p. 34.
22 Antony Lake, ‘Bosnia Policy after the Fall of Bihac’, memorandum for the president, 27 
 November 1994, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-11-27B.pdf, accessed 
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months. It was not until the summer of 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs, possibly 
emboldened by the hesitant nature of Western policy, overran Srebrenica and 
killed virtually its entire male population, that the Americans and Europeans 
were finally shamed into launching a more robust air campaign that facilitated 
a  negotiated end to Bosnian War.23
Even ardent advocates of safe areas for the most part acknowledge that the 
Bosnian experiment failed abysmally. But the main lesson of Srebrenica, they 
argue, is not that safe areas are inherently problematic. Instead, safe areas can 
offer life-saving protection, provided that powerful countries, preferably the 
United States and its major allies, are fully committed to deterring potential 
assailants and repelling them if necessary—which the West shamefully failed 
to do in Bosnia. Supporters of the safe-area/safe zone approach often cite the 
safe zone established in 1991 to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq as a model 
to be followed.24
 Northern Iraq
At the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Kurds of northern Iraq rose up 
against Saddam Hussein’s oppressive rule. Yet troops loyal to the Iraqi dicta-
tor rapidly crushed the rebellion. That prompted hundreds of thousands of 
Kurdish civilians, who feared violent retaliation, to flee toward Turkey and 
Iran. After Turkey closed its border in early April 1991, over half a million Kurds 
became stranded under life-threatening conditions in the mountains along 
the Turkey-Iraq border.25 On 5 April, the unsc adopted Resolution 688, which 
identified the cross-border refugee flows as a ‘threat to international peace and 
security’ and demanded that Iraq allow immediate access to humanitarian 
organisations. Three days later, British Prime Minister John Major proposed 
the establishment of ‘safe enclaves’ for the Kurds on Iraqi territory. The pro-
posal was swiftly endorsed by other European governments. By mid-April, the 
United States also came to support the idea of carving out a protected area for 
13 January 2018. On the Bihac episode, see also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
pp. 154–59.
23 Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, dc: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 90–134; and Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant War-
riors, pp. 128–35.
24 See, for example, Schake, ‘Safe Zones Proved Their Value after the Gulf War’; Robert 
 DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: us Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore, 
md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 25–28; Seybolt, Humanitarian Military 
 Intervention, pp. 191–94; and Orchard, ‘Revisiting Humanitarian Safe Areas’, pp. 60–61.
25 McQueen, Safety Zones, p. 27; and David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 206–7.
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Iraq’s Kurds and offered to lead a robust military operation to this end: the goal 
was to create a secure environment so that the Kurds could descend from the 
mountains and return to their places of origin.26
The us-led operation, code-named Operation Provide Comfort, comprised 
21,000 troops at full deployment, with contributions from France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.27 This credible international mili-
tary presence persuaded the Iraqi government to pull back its forces as the 
us-led coalition advanced. Thomas Pickering, then the us representative to 
the United Nations, explains that ‘we delivered several very tough messages 
through the un channel and we got responses and we got action, in large mea-
sure because we had this huge preponderance of military force, and the Iraqis 
were not sure what we would do’.28 However, President George H.W. Bush was 
unwilling to countenance a protracted us deployment, since his administra-
tion was under pressure from Congress to bring the troops home.29 By July 
1991, with the immediate humanitarian crisis resolved, most us and allied 
troops left Iraq. The relief effort was handed off to un civilian agencies and 
non-governmental organisations. For continued deterrence, the  Western allies 
relied on a no-fly zone established over Iraq’s northern skies (in addition, for a 
few months, they kept a 5,000-strong rapid reaction force stationed across the 
border in Turkey).30
The northern Iraqi safe zone offered effective short-term protection and 
probably saved thousands of human lives. Circumstances at the time were fa-
vourable to the protection forces: Iraq had just suffered a crushing military de-
feat in the Persian Gulf War, making us and allied threats of punishing military 
action with respect to the Kurdish refugee issue uniquely credible. Neverthe-
less, over the medium term, Operation Provide Comfort appears to have had 
several problematic consequences that may actually have undermined civilian 
security in the region. In particular, there is evidence that the establishment of a 
26 Jane E. Stromseth, ‘Iraq’s Repression of its Civilian Population: Collective Responses 
and Continuing Challenges’ in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collec-
tive  Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 
pp. 89–90; Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq 
 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 26–28; and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 149–51.
27 John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm 
 (Carlisle, pa: us Army War College, 1992), p. 57; and DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, p. 26.
28 Author interview with Thomas Pickering, us Permanent Representative to the un, 1989–
92 (Washington, dc, 14 January 2011).
29 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, pp. 37–39; and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 157.
30 McQueen, Safety Zones, pp. 48–50; and Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue, p. 57.
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safe zone by powerful states made the protected group—the Kurds of northern 
Iraq—less willing to compromise during political negotiations, more inclined 
to launch high-risk offensives, and more determined to pursue unilateral se-
cession. The first two of these problematic consequences also occurred in 
 Bosnia; hence, the two cases have more in common than is typically assumed.
 Problematic Outcome One: Reduced Incentives to Compromise
Assuming that safe areas established by powerful states are adequately en-
forced, they can at best ‘freeze’ the underlying political conflict. As Richard 
Haas, a former senior us policymaker, notes, the purpose of safe areas is ‘to 
keep people alive until the political situation changes, not to try to change the 
political situation directly, something that would prove too costly’.31 Ideally, 
safe areas can buy time, allowing diplomatic negotiations on a political settle-
ment to proceed in the meantime. When the Srebrenica safe area in Bosnia 
was established in April 1993, for instance, it was seen as a short-term measure, 
to remain in place until the peace negotiations, which at the time seemed to 
be making good progress, culminated in a final settlement.32 However, if the 
negotiations stall and the war continues—which is precisely what happened 
in Bosnia—safe areas may have to remain in place indefinitely to protect civil-
ian populations exposed to the threat of mass atrocities. This raises a dilemma 
known as the ‘end-state problem’: if the protection forces leave before a politi-
cal solution is reached, they risk re-creating the same threatening conditions 
that prompted the international intervention.33
In situations of ethnic civil war, safe areas established by powerful states 
typically offer protection to the members of one (or several) groups against 
the threat posed by other groups. What has not been sufficiently recognised 
to date is that when such safe areas encompass sizeable territories, they may 
complicate political negotiations and thus reduce the odds of a negotiated 
settlement. Assuming that the safe areas are adequately enforced, they will 
somewhat relieve the pressure on the protected groups, which are often the 
militarily weaker parties in the civil war; consequently, those groups are likely 
to view a political settlement as less urgent and may harden their stance at the 
31 Richard Haass, ‘Military Force: A User’s Guide’, Foreign Policy 96: 21–38 (1994), p. 26.
32 McQueen, Safety Zones, pp. 65–66.
33 Roland Paris, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” and the Structural Problems of Preventive 
Humanitarian Intervention’, International Peacekeeping 21/5: 569–603 (2014), p. 576.
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negotiating table. If fighting continues outside the safe areas and sometimes 
within them, while negotiations are drawn out for months or even years, civil-
ian populations will suffer. In extreme cases, it might be that in the absence of 
protected safe areas and other forms of assistance to militarily weaker groups, 
these groups would sue for peace and accept a political settlement sooner in 
order to avoid complete battlefield defeat—potentially at a lesser overall cost 
in terms of civilian lives lost.
For instance, there is evidence that in Bosnia, once the un had established 
the safe areas and nato was seemingly committed to their protection, Alija 
Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Muslim leader, significantly hardened his stance in 
the peace negotiations. In August 1993, international mediators David Owen 
and Thorvald Stoltenberg presented a peace plan based on the principle of eth-
nic partition. The plan was conditionally accepted by the other parties; report-
edly, however, the Bosnian Muslim side now had to be pressured even just ‘to 
return to the talks after its hopes had been raised that nato was preparing to 
intervene in Bosnia’.34 The Muslims, who had faced a concrete risk of military 
defeat only months earlier, demanded significant additional territories beyond 
the thirty percent of the country awarded to them in the Owen- Stoltenberg 
proposal. When these demands were not met, Izetbegovic doomed the peace 
plan to failure by rejecting it in early September.35 Tens of thousands of civil-
ians died as the war raged on for another two years, before a peace agreement 
was finally achieved at Dayton in late 1995 that partially reversed Serb territo-
rial gains.36
Similarly, in northern Iraq in 1991, after the United States and its allies es-
tablished the safe zone and pledged to protect the Kurdish population, Kurd-
ish rebel forces became more ambitious in their political demands, seeking to 
extend their territorial control far beyond the protected enclave. The Kurds 
demanded that the cities of Kirkuk, Khaniqin, and Mandali (the latter two situ-
ated more than 100 miles outside the safe zone) be conceded to them. This 
contributed to the failure of political negotiations with Iraqi government au-
thorities on a formal autonomy agreement for the Kurdish region, which the 
34 Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 268.
35 Paul Lewis, ‘At un, Bosnian Presses his Plea for More Land’, New York Times, 8 September 
1993. See also Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 271–78.
36 According to the demographic unit of the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (icty), 104,732 people died from the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 
1995. See Jan Zwierzchowski and Ewa Tabeau, ‘The 1992–95 War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
Census-Based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties’ Undercount’, http://www.icty 
.org,  accessed 13 January 2018.
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United States and its allies had strongly supported—not least because it could 
have reduced the need for outside protection.37
In the northern Iraq case, notwithstanding repeated provocations by Kurd-
ish militias (discussed in more detail later), Iraqi government authorities did 
not resume large-scale hostilities against the Kurds. Iraq’s government held 
back, even after the United States and its allies withdrew their ground forces, in 
large part because of the continued credible threat of international air strikes. 
But oppressive leaders elsewhere are unlikely to be as easily intimidated as 
Saddam Hussein was in the aftermath of his humbling defeat in the 1991 Gulf 
War. Furthermore, deterrence through air power may be altogether unfeasible 
in complex civil wars fought in densely populated areas. Absent a political 
compromise, one is left with the spectre of a return to large-scale atrocities 
against civilians as soon as the international protection forces withdraw.
 Problematic Outcome Two: High-risk Offensives Launched from 
Within the Safe Areas
Ideally, once a safe area is established, robust military forces from powerful 
states will ensure its protection for as long as necessary, and militias inside the 
area will be disarmed. In practice, however, because of resource  constraints 
and pressures from domestic audiences at home, powerful states are likely to 
be able to deploy their troops on civilian protection missions only for relatively 
short periods of time. Consequently, the international protectors can be ex-
pected to want to build up rather than dismantle the defensive capabilities of 
the  protected, especially when no imminent peace settlement is in sight. At a 
minimum, the protectors are likely to resist disarming the protected, because 
they understand that such measures might make it very difficult for the inter-
national forces to leave.
The Srebrenica safe area, as noted, was initially proclaimed a demilitarised 
zone under un auspices. But the United States subsequently pushed back 
against disarming the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and in the other safe ar-
eas, sensing that this would leave the Muslims exceedingly vulnerable.38 After it 
became clear that the Western powers had no appetite for ensuring robust pro-
tection of the safe areas, the head of un peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, also stressed 
in a message to un forces that they ‘should not participate too  actively in 
37 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, revised ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 
pp. 376–8. Romano (Kurdish Nationalist Movement, p. 208, n. 71) concludes that ‘the allied 
offer of a safe haven made the negotiations’ failure not too surprising’.
38 McQueen, Safety Zones, pp. 73–74.
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“ disarming the victims”’.39 Consequently, the idea of disarming the Bosnian 
safe areas was quietly shelved. In northern Iraq in 1991, disarming Kurdish 
militias inside the safe enclave was never among the international coalition’s 
 objectives; indeed, given that the United States wanted to withdraw its troops 
quickly, us forces ended up cooperating quite closely with the militias.40 
 Recent plans to establish safe areas in Syria, Libya, and Iraq likewise make no 
mention of demilitarisation.41
If a local group is allowed to maintain its own military forces within an in-
ternationally protected safe area, while hostilities continue elsewhere, there 
is a non-negligible possibility that the group will seek to exploit the safe area 
to advance its own military objectives. At the most basic level, safe areas al-
low militias from protected groups to recover from battle and reorganise. After 
they have had time to recover, the militias may use the safe areas as staging 
grounds for high-risk offensive operations, deliberately putting civilian lives 
at risk in the hope of drawing the protection forces more deeply into the war.
Such behaviour can be explained by the theory of ‘moral hazard’, accord-
ing to which declarations and concrete steps taken by international actors 
to indicate that they are willing to protect a vulnerable party may encourage 
greater risk-taking by the latter.42 The ‘moral hazard of humanitarian inter-
vention’ argument remains contested. In its strong form, the argument holds 
that when outside powers signal their willingness to protect vulnerable groups 
through military intervention, this ‘unintentionally fosters rebellion’ by en-
couraging armed factions from within these groups to initiate violence against 
other (stronger) groups.43 But, as Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams have shown, 
there is little evidence that expectations of humanitarian intervention cause 
sub-state groups to take up arms against stronger opponents.44 In its weaker 
form, the moral hazard argument holds that the prospect of humanitarian 
39 Annan, ‘Srebrenica’.
40 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, pp. 29–30.
41 See, for example, Karen DeYoung, ‘Kerry: Talks with Russia Seek to Separate Rival Forces 
in Syria with Safe Zones’, Washington Post, 2 May 2016; bbc Monitoring Middle East, ‘Alge-
ria, Tunisia “Rejected Western Proposal for Safe Zone” in Libya’; and Soguel, ‘A Sanctuary 
for Iraqi Yazidis’.
42 Dane Rowlands and David Carment, ‘Moral Hazard and Conflict Intervention’ in Murray 
Wolfson (ed.), The Political Economy of War and Peace (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998); Kuper-
man, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’; and Andrew H. Kydd and Scott 
Straus, ‘The Road to Hell? Third-Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities’, American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 57/3: 673–84 (2013).
43 Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 51.
44 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘On the Limits of Moral Hazard: The “Responsi-
bility to Protect”, Armed Conflict and Mass Atrocities’, European Journal of International 
 377The Paradox of Safe Areas in Ethnic Civil Wars
global responsibility to protect 10 (2018) 362-386
<UN>
 intervention may foster escalation (rather than initiation) of rebel violence.45 
Anecdotal evidence, for instance from the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999, supports 
this weaker form of the argument: from the fall of 1998 onward, sustained 
talk of humanitarian intervention by nato in response to Serbia’s repressive 
actions emboldened the Kosovo Liberation Army, the region’s main rebel 
group, to step up its own military offensives against Serb security forces.46
To date, the moral hazard argument had not been applied to safe areas. 
Yet evidence from the northern Iraq and Bosnia safe areas supports the moral 
hazard argument in its weaker form. In both cases, the establishment of safe 
areas signalled that powerful states had committed themselves to protecting 
vulnerable parties. This encouraged these parties to behave more recklessly 
and, in particular, to launch high-risk military offensives aimed at drawing the 
protectors more deeply into the conflict.
In northern Iraq, after coalition forces had established the safe zone in the 
spring of 1991, Kurdish peshmerga militias stepped up their assaults on Iraqi 
army units, seeking a more decisive international intervention in support of 
an expanded area under Kurdish control and of ultimate Kurdish self-determi-
nation.47 Subsequently, as the us-led coalition started to withdraw, coalition 
members issued stern warnings to Iraqi authorities that renewed oppression 
of the Kurds would result in crippling air strikes and possibly another ground 
intervention. These pronouncements, buttressed by the presence of the rapid 
reaction force over the border in Turkey, encouraged the Kurds to keep up their 
offensives. Peshmerga units continued to ambush Iraqi army detachments un-
til well into the fall of 1991, reportedly hoping to trigger an Iraqi crackdown 
and thus ‘to provoke’ another international intervention.48 Kurdish militia 
 Relations, 18:3: 539–71 (2011), esp. pp. 546–48. See also Jon Western, ‘Illusions of Moral 
Hazard: A Conceptual and Empirical Critique’, Ethnopolitics, 4/2: 225–36 (2005).
45 Roberto Belloni, ‘The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the “Responsibility to Protect”’, 
Ethnopolitics, 5/4: 327–46 (2006); and Rowlands and Carment, ‘Moral Hazard and Conflict 
Intervention’.
46 Wolfgang Petritsch, the European Union’s envoy to Kosovo at the time, writes that the 
kla’s increased attacks from November 1998 onward were clearly intended to bring about 
Serb retaliation, with the goal of triggering a us-led military intervention. See Wolfgang 
Petritsch and Robert Pichler, Kosovo-Kosova: Der Lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt: 
 Wieser, 2004), p. 148. See also David Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention 
and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville, tn: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), Ch. 7.
47 Meir Litvak, ‘Civil War in Iraq’ in Ami Ayalon (ed.), Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 
15 (Boulder, co: Westview Press, 1991), p. 428; and Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, 
pp. 29–30.
48 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, p. 378.
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attacks resulted in renewed serious clashes between the militias and Iraqi gov-
ernment forces, with hundreds of civilians killed and tens of thousands forced 
to flee their homes, before intensified us sabre-rattling finally persuaded Iraq’s 
government to completely withdraw its military forces from the region in late 
October.49
The Bosnian safe areas, with nato seemingly committed to their protec-
tion, similarly emboldened the main protected group—the Bosnian Muslims. 
From early on, Muslim fighters took advantage of the safe areas to regroup and 
rest.50 Gradually, Muslim militias also began to use the safe areas as staging 
grounds for offensive operations, in spite of their military inferiority vis-à-vis 
the Bosnian Serbs, thus knowingly putting civilian populations inside the safe 
areas at risk. The Muslims’ hope was that they would eventually persuade the 
United States and its allies to intervene more decisively on their behalf.51
In April 1994, Bosnian Muslim forces staged an attack out of the Gorazde 
safe area, and after a Serb a counteroffensive began to inflict heavy casualties 
on civilians inside the area, the Muslims succeeded for the first time in trigger-
ing limited nato air strikes against Serb military installations.52 Likewise, in 
October 1994, Muslim forces launched an offensive out of the Bihac safe area, 
again triggering limited nato air strikes when the safe area came under Serb 
shelling.53 Evidence made available through the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia (icty) indicates that Srebrenica, too, was used as 
a jumping-off point for Muslim guerrilla activity in eastern Bosnia, before the 
safe area was taken by Serb forces in July 1995.54 The ensuing gruesome massacre 
of Muslim men in Srebrenica played a key role in triggering a more substantial 
nato air campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, which  significantly strength-
ened the Muslims’ bargaining position during subsequent negotiations that 
49 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, p. 39; and McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 
p. 378.
50 Landgren, ‘Safety Zones and International Protection’, p. 447; and McQueen, Safety Zones, 
p. 76.
51 As Walter Slocome, who at the time was responsible for us policy coordination at the 
Pentagon recalls, ‘the Bosniak [Bosnian Muslim] tactic of course was to induce the un 
into the war’. Author interview (Washington, dc, 9 June 2011). See also Kuperman, ‘The 
Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 60.
52 McQueen, Safety Zones, pp. 77–78; and Burg and Shoup, War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
pp. 146–47.
53 United Nations, ‘Report on the fall of Srebrenica’, pp. 38–39; and McQueen, Safety Zones, 
p. 79.
54 icty, ‘PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIC’, Case No. it-98–33-T (2 August 2001), pp. 8–9, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf, accessed 13 January 2018.
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ended the war.55 There is a disturbing possibility that if powerful states had not 
signalled their willingness to intervene to protect the Bosnian safe areas, by the 
spring of 1993, the Muslims, far from launching further offensives, would have 
sued for peace. The war could thus have ended sooner—admittedly, at the cost 
of significant territorial losses for the Muslim side, but potentially at a lower 
cost in terms of civilian casualties.56
 Problematic Outcome Three: Inflamed Secessionist Passions
When safe areas established by powerful states encompass sizeable territories 
inhabited by a particular ethnic group, and that group considers the territories 
to be part of its national homeland, this is likely to fuel secessionist sentiments. 
Some political philosophers argue that, in principle, we should ‘let [any] en-
compassing group that forms a substantial majority in a territory have the 
right to determine whether that territory shall form an independent state’.57 
Others advocate a narrower right to secede, limited to groups that suffer seri-
ous human rights violations at the hands of the existing state.58 The available 
 evidence, however, indicates that non-consensual secession and territorial par-
tition, whether de facto or de jure, have more often than not ‘fomented further 
violence and forced mass migration’.59 In the absence of either massive popu-
lation transfers to achieve ethnically homogeneous territories, or protracted 
(and costly) international stabilisation missions, non-consensual secession in 
fragile states is likely to undermine civilian security over the medium term.60
55 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 64–78; and Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, 
pp. 128–30.
56 In March 1993, Muslim leaders in Srebrenica had accepted Serb demands for surrender 
negotiations, before the unsc changed the situation by declaring Srebrenica a safe area. 
See McQueen, Safety Zones, p. 58.
57 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’, Journal of Philosophy, 
87/9: 439–62 (1990), p. 457.
58 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), Ch. 8.
59 Radha Kumar, ‘The Troubled History of Partition’, Foreign Affairs, 76/1: 22–34 (1997), 
p.  24. See also Bridget Coggins, ‘The History of Secession’ in Aleksandar Pavkovic and 
 Peter  Radan (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2011), esp. pp. 32–37.
60 Even scholars sympathetic to ethnic partition acknowledge its destabilising implications 
over the medium term and emphasise that ‘large-scale population transfers’ are needed 
for it to yield longer-term stability. See Chaim Kaufmann, ‘When All Else Fails: Ethnic 
Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century’, International Security, 
23/2: 120–56 (1998), p. 121.
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In Bosnia, the safe areas did not directly fuel secessionism, as the country’s 
Muslims, whom the safe areas were primarily intended to protect, were com-
mitted to maintaining a unitary Bosnian state. By contrast, the northern Iraqi 
safe zone established in 1991 clearly inflamed secessionist passions: the safe 
zone encompassed large swathes of Iraqi Kurdistan; the Kurds had a long-
standing desire to establish their own state; and they viewed the international 
intervention as their best chance yet to realise their political aspirations. In-
deed, when the United States and its allies intervened to carve out a protected 
enclave in northern Iraq, they understood that this could fuel secessionist 
tendencies.61 Concerns about Iraq’s territorial integrity among the broader un 
membership also explain why, although unsc Resolution 688 demanded that 
Iraq allow access to humanitarian organisations, the Security Council stopped 
short of explicitly authorising military intervention to assist the Kurds.62
The United States and its allies framed Operation Provide Comfort in north-
ern Iraq as a purely humanitarian relief mission, seeking to allay international 
concerns at the unsc and elsewhere that the safe zone might enable Kurdish 
secessionism. But once the us-led coalition had pledged to protect the Iraqi 
Kurds, it entered into a political dialogue with the Kurdish leadership aimed 
at streamlining the delivery of humanitarian assistance, thus legitimising that 
leadership.63 As noted, the establishment of the safe zone also emboldened 
Kurdish guerrilla fighters, until the Iraqi government, fearing us air strikes, de-
cided to completely withdraw its forces from the region. That enabled Kurdish 
rebels to take control of an area roughly the size of Switzerland. In 1992, the 
Kurds then held elections for a Kurdish parliament and established their own 
government. Hence, within less than a year, the us-led intervention, notwith-
standing its limited civilian protection objectives, had enabled the creation of 
the de facto state of Iraqi Kurdistan.64
Kosovo is another example of a large safe area set up by powerful states 
that fuelled secessionism. In the spring of 1999, after a 78-day nato air cam-
paign drove Serb security forces out of Kosovo, the Western alliance arguably 
‘creat[ed] a large safe zone that consisted of the entire province’, with the goal 
of protecting the local ethnic Albanian population.65 In this case, the United 
States offered the secessionists its explicit political backing: before the launch 
61 Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, pp. 25–27; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 149; and 
DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, pp. 26, 29.
62 See McQueen, Safety Zones, pp. 35–36; and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 144–6.
63 Marianna Charountaki, The Kurds and u.s. Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2011), 
pp. 168–70.
64 Romano, Kurdish Nationalist Movement, p. 208; and Charountaki, Kurds and us Foreign 
Policy, p. 171.
65 Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 215.
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of nato’s air campaign, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had promised 
the Kosovar Albanians in a secret letter that if they cooperated with Washing-
ton, they would soon be able to hold an internationally supervised referendum 
on independence.66
 Difficulties Handing Off Stabilisation to Multilateral Forces
In Kosovo, after nato had established a de facto safe area encompassing the 
entire province, the Western alliance was able to summon the political will 
to maintain a long-term military presence and thus to preserve political sta-
bility, in large part because of the region’s strategic importance to Europe.67 
However, if the United States and its allies intervened to establish large safe 
areas in strategically less important regions populated by militant secession-
ists, domestic pressures at home would make it difficult for the interveners 
to sustain the long-term military commitments that may well be needed to 
preserve stability and protect vulnerable civilians.68 In such circumstances, 
continued protection of civilians would probably depend on the interveners’ 
ability to gradually hand off the stabilisation burden to more broadly based un 
peacekeeping missions.
Such multilateral handoffs, however, are likely to be difficult when the ini-
tial military intervention that set up the safe area lacked authorisation and 
hence legitimation from the un Security Council.69 Indeed, China and  Russia, 
with restive ethnic minorities of their own, are unlikely to offer any kind of 
support at the unsc for non-consensual safe areas intended to protect groups 
with secessionist aspirations.
66 uk Select Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Kosovo: History of the Crisis’, 
Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 April 2000, para. 60, www 
.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/9111803.htm, accessed 13 
January 2018. See also Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd ed. (New Haven, ct: Yale 
University Press, 2002), p. 215.
67 Kosovo achieved full (de jure) statehood in 2008 without further large-scale bloodshed. 
See Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Ch. 11–12.
68 On how domestic pressures at home make it difficult for Western powers to sustain long-
term humanitarian troop deployments, see James Lindsay, ‘Congress and the Use of Force 
in the Post-Cold War Era’ in The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War 
Era (Queenstown, md: Aspen Institute, 1995); and William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, 
While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton, nj: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), Ch. 2.
69 On how advance unsc approval for armed intervention increases the odds of longer-
term international burden sharing, see Stefano Recchia, ‘Authorising Humanitarian 
 Intervention: A Five-Point Defence of Existing Multilateral Procedures’, Review of Interna-
tional Studies, 43/1: 50–72 (2017), esp. pp. 66–68.
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In the 1991 northern Iraq crisis, once the United States and its allies had 
intervened, they sought the Security Council’s backing for a un peacekeep-
ing force to maintain stability after the coalition’s departure. But several other 
unsc members, including China, viewed the original intervention that had 
established the safe zone as illegitimate, given its de facto support for a se-
cessionist movement (as noted, the intervention had no explicit un backing). 
Consequently, the unsc was unwilling to support a follow-on un peacekeep-
ing mission in the area.70 Lack of a protracted international military presence 
to maintain stability in northern Iraq resulted in a vicious civil war between 
Kurdish factions from 1994 to 1998, which produced thousands of civilian 
casualties and tens of thousands of internally displaced.71 Likewise today, a hy-
pothetical safe area established by the United States to protect the Syrian Kurds 
would be unlikely to secure un backing. In the absence of a comprehensive 
peace agreement among the local parties, that would make subsequent inter-
national burden sharing to stabilise the safe area very difficult.
 Risk of Regional Spillovers
Finally, when powerful states establish safe areas that wittingly or unwittingly 
advance the cause of militant secessionists, this may have destabilising re-
gional spillover effects. Oppressed minorities elsewhere may be emboldened 
to take matters into their own hands, in the hope that they, too, will bene-
fit from international assistance. The creation of a Kurdish de facto state in 
northern Iraq appears to have galvanised Kurdish armed groups in Turkey, pro-
ducing a period of bloody conflict between the government in Ankara and its 
own Kurdish population between 1992 and 1995 that caused massive civilian 
suffering.72 Likewise, there is evidence that nato’s intervention in support 
of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population and subsequent establishment of a 
large de facto safe area emboldened militant Albanian secessionists in nearby 
countries: in Macedonia between 2000 and 2001 the secessionists turned to 
violence, seeking to ‘liberate’ majority-Albanian parts of the country. Although 
casualty numbers remained relatively low in this case, thousands of civilians 
were forced to flee their homes.73
70 McQueen, Safety Zones, p. 49; and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 156.
71 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 386–89; and Romano, Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement, pp. 209–10.
72 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 381–84; and Landgren, ‘Safe Zones and Inter-
national Protection’, p. 443.
73 Peter H. Liotta, ‘Spillover Effect: Aftershocks in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia’, Wilson 
Center Policy Brief No. 268, July 2011; and bbc News, ‘Casualties in the Macedonian Con-
flict’, 19 March 2001.
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 Conclusion
Activists and scholars calling on powerful states to intervene militarily to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities often invoke the Holocaust analogy.74 
The Nazi Holocaust of the 1940s is the paradigmatic case in which military 
intervention to protect innocent civilians was morally justified and perhaps 
required. However, in today’s ethno-sectarian conflicts, most of the parties are 
typically armed and, to the extent that mass violence is inflicted upon civilians, 
the perpetrators often view it as a means to increase their bargaining leverage 
and extract concessions from the targeted group.75 In such contexts, outside 
intervention by powerful states—even if only for the purpose of establishing 
safe areas—can change the local balance of power and hence the political 
74 Benjamin Valentino and Ethan Weinberg, ‘More than Words? “Genocide,” Holocaust 
Analogies, and Public Opinion in the United States’, Journal of Human Rights, 16/3: 276–
92 (2017); and Aaron Magid, ‘Evoking Holocaust, Lawmakers Demand “Never Again” for 
Syria’, Jewish Journal, 22 March 2017.
75 See, for example, Alex de Waal, ‘Violence and Peacemaking in the Political Marketplace’, 
Accord, 25: 17–20 (April 2014).
Table 1 Problematic outcomes of safe areas established by powerful states
Hardening of  
negotiating stance
Offensives staged 
from protected area
Secessionism Regional 
spillover
Northern Iraq Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bosnia Yes Yes No* Yes*
Rwanda× No Yes No No
Kosovo¤ Yes No Yes Yes
*Serb secessionism in Bosnia was not directly fuelled by the safe areas, which aimed primarily 
at protecting Bosnian Muslim, rather than Serb, civilians. However, the Bosnian safe areas  
had regional spillover effects, inspiring Muslim Albanian insurgents in Kosovo.
×The Rwandan safe zone was established very late in the civil war and did not markedly  
influence the war’s course. Nevertheless, extremist Hutu militia members operated within the 
zone, killing Tutsis.
¤This de facto safe area, established after open hostilities ended, made the Kosovar Albanians 
less interested in a negotiated solution with Belgrade and boosted their aspirations toward 
national independence.
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calculations of local groups, deterring atrocities in the short term but poten-
tially increasing the risk of violence against civilians over the medium term.
Powerful states considering the establishment of safe areas for civilian pro-
tection purposes need to be aware of the potential downsides. In particular, 
as this article has suggested, they need to take seriously the possibility that 
internationally proclaimed safe areas encompassing large territories may un-
dermine civilian protection over the medium term by (a) making protected 
groups less likely to compromise during peace negotiations; (b) encouraging 
protected groups to use the areas as staging grounds for high-risk military of-
fensives; and (c) emboldening militant secessionist movements. What, then, 
can be done to minimise the likelihood of such adverse outcomes occurring?
If powerful states choose to intervene militarily with the goal of establish-
ing safe areas, they should make it clear that they will not take sides in the 
local conflict. This is essential to avoid ambiguities that might otherwise be 
exploited by local parties. Safe areas should also preferably be limited to ur-
ban agglomeration areas, hospital zones, and camps for refugees and internally 
displaced persons, rather than encompassing entire provinces or regions, to 
minimise the likelihood that they will shift the balance of power in the civil 
war and to reduce the risk of unwittingly abetting militant secessionists. In 
addition, the interveners should make it clear to the protected group(s) from 
the outset that any attempts to exploit the safe areas for military advantage will 
be counterproductive: they will be condemned and potentially result in a scal-
ing down of the international commitment. Finally, safe areas should ideally 
be fully demilitarised, in order to emphasise their civilian and non-political 
character, in line with the 1977 additional protocol to the fourth Geneva Con-
vention. This, however, would require a strong international military commit-
ment for as long as necessary, potentially for several years.
Prospective interveners need to be aware (and should explain to their do-
mestic audiences) that establishing safe areas in complex ethnic wars is un-
likely to be a low-cost means of civilian protection; instead, it may result in ex-
pensive commitments of indefinite duration. If powerful states are unwilling 
to shoulder such potentially long-term commitments for civilian protection 
purposes, it may be unwise for them to deploy their own troops to establish 
non-consensual safe areas to begin with—especially in the absence of broader 
multilateral buy-in.
When powerful outside actors decide not to deploy their troops on the 
ground to establish safe areas in situations where a risk of mass atrocities ex-
ists, they could still help relieve human suffering in various ways. First, at a 
minimum, they could support humanitarian relief organisations logistically 
and financially. Second, they could deploy their leverage— including through 
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the imposition of economic sanctions and by conducting targeted air strikes, 
where feasible—with the goal of persuading the conflicting parties themselves 
to negotiate local cease-fires and proclaim consensual safe areas, as a first 
step towards a comprehensive cessation of hostilities. For instance, in 2017, 
Russia, Turkey, and Iran brokered a series of local cease-fires in Syria between 
the government and various rebel factions that resulted in the establishment 
of four limited safe zones, or ‘de-escalation zones’ (although these cease-fires 
remained exceedingly fragile in the absence of sustained pressure on the 
Syrian government).76
Safe areas established by consent among the local parties should not have 
to rely entirely on the parties’ voluntary compliance for their success. Once 
an agreement has been achieved, international (preferably un) forces could 
be deployed to monitor compliance and, if necessary, repel attacks by ren-
egade factions. Alternatively, un peacekeepers already deployed in civilian 
protection missions with the overall (‘strategic’) consent of the conflicting 
parties could proclaim limited safe areas out of their own initiative—for in-
stance, around food distribution centres, hospital zones, and refugee camps. 
Such limited safe areas, established without the parties’ ‘tactical’ consent, 
could facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and provide tempo-
rary protection to vulnerable civilians.77 For example, in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (drc), since 2003, un forces have repeatedly established 
limited ‘humanitarian  buffer zones’ and demilitarised ‘security zones’ for 
precisely these purposes. Likewise, in the Central African Republic (car), un 
forces have established various ‘weapons free zones’ to protect civilians from 
armed groups.78
Safe areas policed by un peacekeepers probably will not be able to offer the 
same level of short-term security that can be expected when powerful states 
76 Frederik Pleitgen, ‘Inside Syria’s Safe Zones, Russia and Assad Hold the Cards’, cnn, 7 
August 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/07/middleeast/syria-safe-zones-russia/index 
.html, accessed 13 January 2018; and Nada Homsi and Anne Barnard, ‘Marked for 
 “De- escalation,” Syrian Towns Endure Surge of Attacks’, New York Times, 18 November 2017.
77 For the distinction between ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ consent in un peacekeeping, see 
undpko, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York, 
2008), Ch. 2.
78 On the drc, see McQueen, Safety Zones, p. 161; un News Centre, ‘un Peacekeepers Set Up 
Buffer Zone in dr Congo to Facilitate Relief Aid Deliveries’, 21 December 2004; and Jes-
sica Hatcher, ‘un Gears Up for drc offensive as Goma laments escalating violence’, The 
Guardian, 8 August 2013. On the car, see ‘un Establishes “Weapons-Free Zone” in Central 
African Republic’, Reuters, 9 September 2015; and Radio France Internationale, ‘rca: à 
Kaga-Bandoro, les armes n’ont pas complètement disparu’, 2 February 2016.
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deploy their own troops in more ambitious operations under national com-
mand. However, on the upside, as long as safe areas and neutral zones policed 
by un peacekeepers encompass only narrowly delimited territories and are 
prevented from becoming safe havens for armed groups, they are unlikely to 
change the political calculations of local parties in ways that may fuel the con-
flict and thereby worsen the plight of vulnerable civilians over the medium 
term. When it comes to protecting civilians from mass atrocities, less can 
sometimes be more.
